capable of not only reading but, optionally, writing to the magnetic strips on
The approaches differ in where they draw the boundary. Namespaces use the same kernel but restrict visibility. Seccomp uses the same kernel but restricts the allowed syscall set. Projects like gVisor use a completely separate user-space kernel and make minimal host syscalls. MicroVMs provide a dedicated guest kernel and a hardware-enforced boundary. Finally, WebAssembly provides no kernel access at all, relying instead on explicit capability imports. Each step is a qualitatively different boundary, not just a stronger version of the same thing.
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“陈代表，一定要帮我们多争取好政策，‘看天吃饭’风险太大了，一次强台风就能让多年积累归零。”这是全国人大代表、广东越群海洋生物科技股份有限公司生产中心质检员陈阳在过去一年的调研中，听到水产养殖户们说得最多的一句话。
It is also worth remembering that compute isolation is only half the problem. You can put code inside a gVisor sandbox or a Firecracker microVM with a hardware boundary, and none of it matters if the sandbox has unrestricted network egress for your “agentic workload”. An attacker who cannot escape the kernel can still exfiltrate every secret it can read over an outbound HTTP connection. Network policy where it is a stripped network namespace with no external route, a proxy-based domain allowlist, or explicit capability grants for specific destinations is the other half of the isolation story that is easy to overlook. The apply case here can range from disabling full network access to using a proxy for redaction, credential injection or simply just allow listing a specific set of DNS records.